Abstract: If Savulescu's (2001; 
Introduction
In a much-discussed paper, Julian Savulescu 1 (2001; 2009) proposes and defends a provocative ethical principle-procreative beneficence.
Procreative Beneficence (PB): couples (or single reproducers) should 2 select the child, of the possible children they could have, who is expected to have the best life, or at least as good a life as the others, based on the relevant, available information.
Over the past decade, numerous papers 3 have taken critical issue with PB. One avenue involves challenging the principle by way of rejecting something that Savulescu highlights as an important practical implication of the principle, which is that couples should employ genetic tests for non-disease traits 4 in selecting which child to bring into existence.
Potential challenges on this score can be divided into two camps. Firstly, one might reject Savulescu's normative conclusion about non-disease traits while granting the premise that there are non-disease traits such that testing and selecting for them would in fact contribute to bringing about the child who is expected to have the best life (call this the non-disease-trait [NDT] premise) 5 . Alternatively, there is scope for a second type of opposition to Savulescu's normative conclusion, which does not grant this premise. The strategy we pursue in this paper falls into the second category of criticism. However, in locating our approach, a further distinction is required. It is possible to pursue this second strategy either by arguing (i) that NDT is false; or (ii) that Savelescu's strongest case for defending NDT fails.
We think it would be overly ambitious to argue for (i); perhaps there are some nondisease traits that are both appropriately testable and such that testing and selecting for them would have just the results that Savulescu suggests. At any rate, the current state of genetic research is not developed enough to support any sort of deductive line against NDT.
There is, however, a good case to be made for (ii). Savulescu's defence of NDT is one that appeals, at nearly every crucial juncture, to the trait of intelligence 6 . This is because he offers intelligence as the paradigm example of a testable non-disease trait such that testing and selecting for it would increase the likelihood that the child selected would be the one who is expected to have the best life (or at least as good a life as the others 7 ).
We think it is no surprise that Savulescu appeals to intelligence as the obvious candidate trait here, given his aim of supporting NDT: after all, intelligence is plausibly connected with various conceptions of human well-being. Moreover, of those genetic traits plausibly connected to well-being, intelligence is (unlike, say, moral conscience 8 )
something for which we might plausibly locate a testable genetic basis on which embryo selection would be possible.
Despite its prima facie plausibility, we think that Savulescu's paradigm case fails (on several fronts) to support NDT, and our contention that it does will be the focus of what follows. To the extent that Savulescu's appeal to intelligence fails, the primary case Savulescu actually offers for NDT is vitiated. We can appreciate the significance of this observation in the wider context of the debate as follows: without NDT, PB (if true) would fail generate the key mandate Savulescu tells us the principle implies.
The Intelligence Premise
The specific claim we'll now set out to defend, contra Savulescu, is what we'll call
Intelligence (INT): It is not the case that testing and selecting for intelligence would increase the likelihood that the child selected would be the one who is expected 9 to have the best life.
We want to note at the outset that even if it is possible to test and select for intelligence, considerations to do with environment and context 10 bear on the matter whether doing so would contribute to the betterment of the child's life, and we will address some of these issues directly in this section. But first, we want to support INT by raising a more fundamental issue, which concerns the matter of whether intelligence can be defined and selected for in the first place. After raising some of these more fundamental problems, we'll proceed in this section to defend INT by highlighting several considerations that favour an inverse correlation between increased testable aspects of intelligence (e.g. analytical abilities, perceptiveness and memory) and overall quality of life. These considerations, we'll show, must be balanced against the considerations Savulescu cites that suggest a positive correlation between testable aspects of intelligence and overall quality of life. We'll argue that, all things considered, the balance between positive and negative contributions of intelligence to quality of life will be about even. That the balance is even is a real problem for Savulescu's thought that one should employ genetic tests for intelligence in selecting which child to bring into existence. This is because without being able to fall back on the defence that testing and selecting for intelligence raises the likelihood of the selected child being the one who is expected to have the best life, the third sort of considerations we will present in support of INT become more relevant. This third set of considerations concerns the fact that no matter which non-disease traits are selected for, there are a variety of health risks associated with in vitro fertilisation that threaten the likelihood that the selected child would-out of the possible children one could have-be the one who is expected to have the best life
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. Additionally, this third set of considerations highlights connections between genetic contributions to intelligence as balanced against the specifically environmental contributions to intelligence that would be associated with IVF.
All things considered, we will show that there is good reason to think that it is not the case that testing and selecting for intelligence would increase the likelihood that the child selected would-out of the possible children one could have-be the one who is expected to have the best life. Having already outlined the upshot of this result for
Savulescu's argument, we'll now focus exclusively on INT. .'
Such an account of intelligence is intuitively plausible (as a thin descriptive account goes), and is also one on which it seems sensible to suppose that there will be multiple genes capable of contributing to the various abilities of which intelligence is comprised (and so multiple relevant genes that must be located and tested for). Although we have some reservations, we will not be challenging Savulescu's contention that some such genetic bases for intelligence will include dispositions to have good memory and good concentration (among other things). 20 has argued, genes alone do not pre-determine intelligence but rather roughly indicate how likely a person is to be of a particular intelligence level.
Accordingly, a new question becomes salient: on average, what proportion of contribution do genetics and environment respectively make to a person's intelligence?
It has not been ruled out that the specifically genetic contribution may be no more significant to intelligence than are these aforementioned non-genetic factors. For example, behaviour genetic studies by Chipeur et al (199) 21 suggest that around 50% of intelligence differences (between people in a particular population) are due to genetic difference, though in any one individual the extent to which genes contribute to intelligence might be more or less than 50%. Crucially, the quantitative studies that yield this result use psychometric tests, and these have been subject to considerable criticism 22 .
Given these cautions, even if we nonetheless assume that we can locate the genes that can directly influence (to some degree) how intelligent a future person will be, it is at best naïve to suppose we thereby have the ability to 'test for intelligence'. Consider, after all (as Newson and Williamson observe) that compared to IQ tests, genetic tests would likely be less efficient at predicting intelligence; environmental and genetic factors are evident in IQ tests, while genetic tests will provide information about only the latter of these factors.
Plomin (1997: 100) claims that the significant environmental impact combines with the large amount of genes involved in intelligence to make it the case that any one gene relevant to intelligence will only contribute to overall intelligence in a minor way.
Accordingly, Reiss (2000) speculates that we might plausibly bring about more intelligent people by focusing research on developing more effective methods of education and child rearing. Even if there are benefits to be gained from encouraging a more intelligent population, then, it is not obviously the case that genetic projects focused on intelligence would be powerfully instrumental in bringing this about.
The relevance that the above has for our central contention is practical: our view that testing and selecting for intelligence does not obviously increase the likelihood of selecting the child who is expected to have the best life is supported by the fact that it may not even be plausible to suppose that we can effectively test and select for intelligence. That being said, let's put aside the above concerns and assume for now that we can effectively test and select for intelligence using the fruits of genetic research. Would this really lead to selecting the child (of the possible children that one could have) that would have the best expected life? Do more intelligent people have better lives?
We turn now to the considerations that Savulescu supplies for thinking that there is a positive correlation between intelligence and overall quality of life. He pursues two argumentative strategies here. Firstly, he argues that intelligence is a component of the general purpose means that are useful to any plan of life, and as such, provides individuals the freedom to form and act on their own conception of the good life 23 . Secondly, Savulescu advances a presumptive case for thinking that intelligence would promote well-being on any of several plausible accounts of well-being, including (i) the hedonistic account (on which what matters is the pleasure quality of our experiences), (ii) the desire-fulfilment view (on which what matters is the degree to which our desires are satisfied), and (iii) objective list theories (according to which there are certain activities that are good for people, such as worthwhile achievements, dignity, bearing children, knowing a lot about the world, developing talents, and so on) 24 .
With a view to assessing the cogency of his argument, we should note that if his second strategy fails, this significantly undercuts the plausibility of the first. Accordingly, our focus will be on the second strategy.
Hedonism and Intelligence
Savulescu submits that intelligence will promote well-being on a hedonistic account because the capacity to imagine alternative pleasures and remember the salient features of past experiences can facilitate the choosing of future pleasurable choices. This seems right.
However, intelligence can also promote a lack of pleasure, and we will consider this point at a level of abstraction that corresponds with Savulescu's own arguments that intelligence promotes well-being. ) a positive correlation between intelligence and suicide.
While intelligence does promote pleasure in some ways, it also promotes a lack of pleasure in other ways; accordingly, on a hedonistic account of well-being, intelligence cannot be fairly said (without considerable further argument) to promote well-being all things considered-instead, it appears after more judicious consideration, to roughly break even 30 .
Desire-fulfilment and intelligence
Savulescu claims that intelligence promotes well-being on a desire-fulfilment account because 'intelligence is important to choosing means which will best satisfy one's ends.'
Again, it seems like this is right. Likewise, it is clear that intelligence can thwart one's ends in some important cases. The sorts of cases mentioned in the discussion of the hedonistic account apply here mutatis mutandis. For example, for one who seeks the attainment of peace (broadly defined), intelligence can, for reasons previously suggested, stand as a frequent and potentially insurmountable barrier. Similar considerations apply vis-à-vis the end of happy friendships or relationships 31 . Intelligent people might find others predictable and uninteresting, while struggling to find suitably engaging romantic partners. In addition, intelligence is often resented (especially in childhood), and others' feelings of inferiority can lead to social exclusion.
Objective-list theory and intelligence
Finally, Savulescu maintains that intelligence will promote well-being on an objective list account because 'intelligence would be important to gaining knowledge of the world, and developing rich social relations' (both of which are relatively uncontentious objective aims). However, note that these are but two of the ends Savulescu mentions when defining the idea of an objective list account. For example, he also mentions an ability to appreciate beauty, and this ability can easily be undermined by intelligence; the intelligence in virtue of which one can 'see how things work' can prevent one from finding the kind of beauty in wonder as would someone less intelligent 32 . In addition, if intelligence were to afford a heightened ability to appreciate beauty, would it not also afford a heightened ability to detect and comprehend just as much (or more) suffering? At the very least, it seems as though intelligence as a means to appreciating beauty breaks even in terms of effectiveness.
In addition to the ideas advanced in the discussion of the desire-fulfilment account, there are further reasons to think that intelligence stands to hinder as much as foster rich social interactions. For example, a highly intelligent individual might be so consumed by intellectual pursuits that little energy or thought is directed toward colleagues, partners or family members. Alternatively, you might only appear to have rich social relations-people may deeply enjoy your company and conversational skills, but you in turn might find these conversation partners to be so transparent (and their ability to understand your own more complex psychology so contrastingly poor) that the social relations are not experienced as rich by you.
By now it should be clear that the idea that intelligence just obviously promotes well-being is not nearly as plausible as it first appears. Savulescu primarily discusses intelligence broadly construed, but he briefly considers one candidate component of testable intelligence-memory. He defines memory in a highly contentious (and in the context, self-serving) manner, as the ability to 'remember important things when you want to' (p. 420). However, having a good memory also involves remembering things when one would rather not, and at times being 'haunted' by these memories. Savulescu is right that selecting for genes that contribute to the memory component of intelligence may help you to avoid having a child who forgets to take a compass on a dangerous bush walk (as his example claims).
On the other hand, that child may grow up to be haunted by perfect recollections of something awful that they witness, and the more vivid the recollection, the more acute the suffering. Indeed, de Quervain et al. (2012) 33 have discovered that a genetic factor for good memory leads to an increased risk of developing psychological trauma. This study tested over a thousand healthy volunteers and found that those carrying a variant of the PRKCA gene had more brain activity in areas related to memory and exhibited an above average ability to remember learned information. Also investigated were the effects of the PRKCA variant gene on 350 survivors of the genocide in Rwanda. Those with the gene variant had more painful and psychologically troubling memories of the events that occurred during the genocide and were twice as likely to be sufferers of post-traumatic stress disorder. In sum,, it is not obvious that a good memory leads to more well-being than lack thereof.
To recap, then, we have highlighted some substantial considerations that support a negative correlation between intelligence and well-being. We submit that balancing these considerations against the positive contributions of intelligence to quality of life show that intelligence is roughly as likely to increase well-being as it is to decrease well-being (on all of the plausible accounts of well-being that Savulescu mentions). This discredits the supposition that testing and selecting for intelligence would increase the likelihood that the child selected would be the one who would be expected to have the best life, as it does not appear that that intelligence is reliably conducive to bringing about the best life 34 . In short, it does not seem obvious that we should 'expect' possessing a trait that breaks even in terms of effectiveness as a means to well-being (on multiple plausible proposals) to be one that will improve a child's likelihood of being the one that would have the best life.
We can turn now to a different group of considerations that add additional weight to our claim that it is not the case that testing and selecting for intelligence would increase the likelihood that the child selected would be one that would be expected to have the best life.
In vitro fertilization and quality of life Thus far, we have focused on issues that are intimately connected with intelligence.
However, a second set of problems stands to discredit the claim that testing and selecting for intelligence will increase the likelihood that the child selected would be one that would be expected to have the best life. These considerations focus not on intelligence itself but on the practical risks of the scenario that Savulescu describes, i.e. one in which people who would not have otherwise required in vitro fertilisation to conceive nonetheless employ the process in order to select the 'best' child 35 . Our concern in this section is that IVF-which is required for selecting for any non-disease trait-threatens the likelihood that the child one tests and selects for intelligence would (out of the possible children one could have) be the one expected to have the best life. This constitutes further support for our central claim,
INT. Our first set of considerations to this end concerns risks of ectopic pregnancy, and the second set of considerations concerns birth defects 36 .
IVF and Ectopic pregnancy
In an ectopic pregnancy, the fertilised egg develops outside the uterus (typically in one of the fallopian tubes promote well-being as it is to promote the inverse of well-being vitiates a potential reply from Savulescu. Specifically, it serves to undermine the claim that an increased risk of ectopic pregnancy is less significant (vis-à-vis the aim of selecting the child expected to have the best life) than is the alleged increase in overall well-being that results from selecting for intelligence.
IVF and birth defects
In addition to studies suggesting an IVF-conceived baby is less likely to be born than is a naturally conceived baby, it may be the case that children produced by IVF are more likely to have severe health problems. These risks must be weighed against the alleged benefits to a child's well-being brought by intelligence.
It is currently contentious whether IVF is correlated with an increased risk of serious birth defects, but there are some persuasive reports available. . Our overall argument does not require that claim--rather, we submit that since experts do not fully understanding this apparently increased risk of birth defects, the burden of proof that IVF is not responsible for the defects lies with proponents of Savulescu's view. This is because if it is the case that the process of IVF itself increases the risk of birth defects, this is one thing that counts against Savulescu's claim that testing and selecting for intelligence would increase the likelihood that the child selected would be the one who is expected to have the best life.
If it is correct that IVF comes with an increased risk of ectopic pregnancy (which translates to a lower likelihood of being born) and/or an increased risk of certain substantial congenital abnormalities (which in some cases means a shortened life and in all cases means a reduced quality of life in an important sense), this further supports our central claim, INT
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. Once again, testing and selecting for intelligence does not seem to be reliably conducive to bringing about child who has the best life.
The interplay between in vitro fertilization, environment and intelligence
In this final section, we will explore how testing and selecting for intelligence will often lead to circumstances in which the genetic contribution tested and selected for will (at best) break even with negative environmental factors associated with IVF that reduce the likelihood of high intelligence.
$10,000 to $43,000, excluding the costs of previous treatments and the post-natal expenses', and many undergo multiple cycles in attempting to become pregnant 45 . The likelihood of IVF resulting in a live birth is commonly thought to be highly influenced by maternal age, and so the process will be most successful when the woman is at at the peak of her fertility (in the early to mid-twenties). That the optimal maternal age for IVF ends before a woman is in her late twenties combines with the expense of IVF cycles to make it the case that pushing all reproducers to select for intelligence means pushing them to attempt get pregnant at a younger age than they may otherwise have chosen 46 . With this in mind, recall that the general consensus is that genetics are not the only factor influencing intelligenceenvironment also plays a role, and many factors in this environment matter, including the quality of schooling, home environment, rearing style and parental maturity. . One contributing factor was that most of these women had stable jobs and had achieved much of what they wanted in their lives and workplaces, giving them an increased ability to focus on raising children. We also think it plausible that younger mothers will less often be financially secure, and this lack of financial security will in turn mean that (for example) they will be unable to afford as high quality education for children as they would have later in life. This is especially likely to be the case after paying the steep price for at least one cycle of IVF. We submit that this suggests that young parents will, all things considered, be less likely to provide an environment that fosters intellectual development, both in the home and in education. So, even without the health considerations mentioned in §3.2, any benefit of selecting for genes involved in intelligence (which, again, we think is in balance with the costs of being intelligent) gets offset by the likelihood of negative environmental contributions of raising a child when you are younger, less mature, more selfish, less experienced, and most likely less financially secure.
Concluding Remarks
We have explored a cluster of issues here, but it is worth reiterating what we have not attempted to do. We have not (as many other critics of procreative beneficence have) attempted to directly refute PB, but nor have we tried to indirectly challenge PB by arguing against the normative claim Savulescu takes PB to entail: the normative claim that couples should employ genetic tests for non-disease traits in selecting which child to bring into existence.
Our critical interest has been, rather, a premise (granted by both Savulescu and most critics), which we call NDT. Specifically, this is the premise that there are non-disease traits such that testing and selecting for them would in fact contribute to bringing about the child who is expected to have the best life. If this premise is false, then it's false that couples should employ genetic tests for non-disease traits in selecting which child to bring into existence. We haven't attempted to argue deductively for the falsity of the NDT.
Instead, we hope to have cast doubt on it (and by extension PB) by examining the paradigm example that Savulescu uses to support NDT-intelligence. We have argued that under closer scrutiny, appealing to intelligence does not succeed in supporting Savulescu's claim about testing and selecting for non-disease traits. That the argument from intelligence fails to support NDT does not, we contend, imply that NDT is false. More modestly, it shows that Savulescu has not done enough to argue for it.
Independently of the connection our argument has for the debate about procreative beneficence, we hoped to also reveal that some natural assumptions about the connection between intelligence, its testability, and its relationship to well-being are in some instances false and in others too hasty. We suspect that some of the practical setbacks that plague attempts to quantify, measuring, and selecting (via IVF) for intelligence will also apply, mutatis mutandis, to other traits that a defender of NDT might claim are plausibly connected with human well-being. However, an argument on this score is a topic for For the present purposes, we remain agnostic and use the language only to engage with Savulescu on his own terms. 5 Arguments from social inequality fall within this category. Also, as a referee (as well as Robert Sparrow) point out, there is scope to argue in a similar fashion that, even if NDT were true, arguments from eugenics stand to threaten Savulescu's normative conclusion. It is our view that Sparrow has defended the eugenics line well enough, and we will not attempt to recite or improve on his arguments here; our critical focus lies elsewhere. 6 For example, he states (p. 414) that intelligence is one of the non-disease traits for which he believes we are morally obligated to test, and intelligence is the only non-disease trait that he systematically attempts to show promotes well-being on any plausible account (p. 421). We also thank a referee for pointing out that, as an academic, Savulescu might be more inclined than nonacademics to associate intelligence (as opposed to, for instance, emotional empathy) as a hallmark of the good life. To Savulescu's credit, part of his emphasis on intelligence is based on his supposition that it is a feature of the good life that could be tested and selected for. Though, as we argue, even this latter claim turns out to be problematic. 7 Hereafter, for the sake of conciseness we will simply say 'the child who is expected to have the best life.' identify children born from IVF and to create control groups of naturally conceived children. We assume that the known maternal risk factors they discuss include (for example) age and certain antecedent fertility problems. 43 For example, as a referee helpfully observed, there remains uncertainty about whether the problem lies with the donors or with IVF itself. Some donor risk factors could be unknown Kelley-Quonn et al., and they do not considered the role that male donors may play. 44 There may be additional reasons that IVF has a lower live birth rate than does natural conception. However, there are problems sourcing relevant statistics because (i) it is difficult to measure the live birth rate in the general population because of cases in which a woman may be unaware of a fertilised egg that fails to result in a live birth, and (ii) the numbers available about the live birth rate for those undergoing IVF will not exactly mirror the success rates that would be part of a Savulescustyle scenario in which people who did not require IVF to conceive would nonetheless undergo the process. The numbers that would best represent the success of IVF in such as a scenario would be the percentages of different age groups of women with no antecedent fertility problems who use ideally healthy sperm in an IVF cycle and succeed in having a live birth. However, if the live birth rate after IVF really is significantly lower than is the live birth rate resulting from natural conception, this is another sense in which testing and selecting for intelligence does not make it more likely that the selected child will (of the possible children) be the one expected to have the best life. 45 will still be substantial. 46 For example, 2003 figures from the Office of National Statistics in United Kingdom show the number of women who are having pregnancies later in life to be on the rise (with the number of women having children in their thirties and forties increasing sharply over the preceding two decades). In North America, The National Center for Health Statistics shows that between the years of 1980 and 2004 (i) the amount of women having children at age thirty has doubled, (ii) the amount of women having children at age thirty five has tripled, and (iii) the amount of women having children at age forty and over has nearly quadrupled. Further, the Centers for Disease Control report that the birth rate for women 45 and over more than doubled during the twelve years between 1990 and 2002. 47 It is also plausible that older couples or single reproducers make more extensive preparations and put more thought into whether they truly want children, while a lot of younger people may in part be caving to social and familial expectations that are voiced once a committed relationship is part of their lives. 48 The authors owe a special thanks to Jeremy Watkins, with whom correspondence on this topic has been particularly instructive.
